A Comparative Study of Parliamentary Control and Judicial Councils in Regulating Judges: Lessons for Bangladesh

Abstract

The independence, accountability and integrity of the judiciary are the foundational pillars of any democratic constitutional order. Jurisdictions have adopted different types of institutional practices to regulate the behaviour of judges, notably parliamentary control and specialised judicial councils. This article compares the two models and assesses their constitutional legitimacy, structural form, and functional impact on judicial independence. Using doctrinal and comparative examples from South Asia, Europe, and other countries, this article assesses the risks of political influence on parliamentary control. The study also analyses how judicial councils are fashioned to temper such pressures. Using Bangladesh as the focal point, this article evaluates the SJC (Supreme Judicial Council) in its particular political and constitutional setting. The analysis concludes that debates over judicial accountability in Bangladesh should move beyond binary replacement narratives and instead focus on the conditions under which existing mechanisms can be strengthened to better safeguard judicial independence.